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Abstract 
This study considers the speculation made by previous researchers that ‘Theory of mind’ 
(ToM) could have a neural basis. ToM refers to our capacity to make inferences regarding 
other individuals’ mental states and it is vital to how we function within the social world. 
This research is a pilot study to assess if a ToM eye gaze preference task can be administered 
within the confides of an MRI scanner with a secondary aim of considering which brain 
regions could govern our ToM processes.   The task was first administered to healthy controls 
within a pilot study to ensure that the required responses could be produced within certain 
time constraints. Satisfactory results then meant the task could be implemented in an fMRI 
study which was designed with the same time restraints as seen in the pilot study. Within this 
study healthy controls had different BOLD responses when comparing the ToM task against 
a control task within the Hippocampus, Insula and the Superior Temproal Gyrus. Further 
variations were found in the Inferior Parietal Cortex, the Amygdala, the Insula and the STG 
when comparing the neural responses found in the ToM condition to  neural responses 
exhibited in the the favourite condition. In conclusion the main aim of the study was to 
implement and pilot a ToM eye gaze preference task into a novel imaging environment, this 
study has successfully completed this and therefore the task can be utilised within future 
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Neural Basis of Theory of Mind: 
An eye gaze preference task. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Social Cognition 
In 1968 Dr. M. Harlow transcribed the details of a young man whom following a 
horrific brain injury was described as being “changed in the mind” (Damasio, Grabowski, et 
al., 1994; Wilgus, 2009). It was reasoned at this time that the young man had alterations 
within his personality and behaviour, with hindsight the 21
st
 century diagnosis would be that 
he is suffering from a deficit within his social cognition. The term social cognition not only 
involves the concepts of personality and behaviour within its definition but also refers to a 
substantial about of information required for the cognitive processes and abilities that help us 
to navigate the social world in a culturally and socially acceptable manner (Overwalle, 2009). 
Therefore social cognition is how we survive in our social world and involves the processes 
of perceiving, interpreting and acting on social information (Adolph, 2001; Pelphrey, Adolph 
& Morris, 2004). This ability is quintessential a human aptitude which refers to the 
fundamental abilities which allow us to interact with other humans (Adolph, 2001; Pelphrey, 
Adolph & Morris, 2004). Brothers (1990) explains how social cognition is the accumulation 
of accurate perception of the disposition and intentions of other individuals. Whilst 
Carrington and Bailey (2009) extend this definition by adding, that it is our ability to 
understand people via facial expressions, eye gaze, body posture and social linguistic factors 
such as prosody and the social content of speech. Essential social cognition allows us to make 
inferences of transitory states (goals and intentions) and inferences of enduring characteristic 
(personality traits and social scripts) (Carrington et al., 2009). 
It is apparent that social cognition encapsulates a wide scope of information and 
processes and is the driving power behind our social interactions with the world. The present 
study shall concentrate on one aspect of social cognition, the concept in question contributes 
substantial to the definition and process of social cognition (Overwalle, 2009) and is known 
as ‘theory of mind’(ToM) or mentalising.  
1.2 Theory of Mind 
‘Theory of mind’ is an automatic, high level and almost without exception a human 
function (Overwalle, 2009). The basic definition illustrates that theory of mind is our ability 
10 
3013747  Neural Basis 
to explain and predict the behaviour of ourselves and others by attributing mental states to 
them, such as beliefs, desires, emotions or intentions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Hence it 
allows us to understand another’s desires and intentions are distinct from our own. The idea 
originated from primatologists who described how it was possible that chimpanzees 
understood certain mental states in other chimpanzees (Brothers, 1990).  
In recent years the definition for this aptitude has evolved and evidence has been 
placed forth arguing for the concept to be defined as two components. Evidence for this is 
reflected in individuals who are known to have impairments in their mentalising abilities 
within everyday life, but can still complete particular ToM tasks (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, 
Yaniv & Aharon- Peretz, 2002). Separating the mentalising process was first proposed by 
Brothers and Ring (1992), who suggested that it may be more appropriate to define it as ‘hot’ 
and ‘cold’ theory of mind abilities, where ‘hot’ ToM would refer to emotional inferences 
made whilst the ‘cold’ reflected the cognitive aspects of ToM. This proposal is often linked 
with the more recent postulation by Shamay- Tsoory et al., 2002 (Shamay- Tsoory, Tomer, 
Berger & Peretz, 2005; Shamay- Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007a; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-
Peretz & Levkovitz, 2007b). These authors outline that the theory of mind can be subdivided 
into cognitive and affective components as seen in the concept of empathy (Kramer, 
Mohammadi, Donamayor, Samii & Munte, 2010). Cognitive theory of mind considers 
inferences regarding other people’s beliefs while affective theory of mind refers to the 
inferences made regarding others’ emotions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).   
Another manner in which mentalising has been compartmentalised is depicted by 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). They recommend that theory of mind be considered has 
having one component responsible for detecting or decoding mental states from the available 
observable information, this includes facial expressions, biological motion and action 
understanding. While the second component considers the reason behind the mental state in 
order to explain or predict the individuals’ actions. This can be referred to as making a 
distinction between the social perceptive component of theory of mind and the social 
cognitive component.  
Theory of mind within the current instance will be considered in terms of the more 
general and basic definition, in the sense that the task used shall not consider the idea of 
splitting theory of mind abilities into either cognitive/ affective ToM or social perceptive/ 
social cognitive components of ToM. 
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The debate surrounding how our mentalising skill should be defined is not the only 
disputable issue within the ToM literature. As controversy revolves around how we integrate 
the vast amount of information required for our ToM aptitude. Currently there are two key 
theories which have attempted to explain the method behind this aptitude. One hypothesis is 
known as ‘Theory Theory’ it argues that the mental states attributed to other people are 
conceived from unobservable, theoretical posits, invoked to explain and predict behaviour 
(Gallase, Keyers & Rizzzolatti, 2004). Therefore we have principles and concepts which 
govern the inferences we make about others (Apperly, 2008).  Whilst the alternative process 
known as the ‘Simulation Theory’ explains how mental states of others are presented by 
tracking or matching their states with meaningful states of one’s own (Gallase et al. 2004). 
This theory allows for one to model other’s intentions and future actions using our own mind. 
This capability could be facilitated by the mirror neurones (Pineda, 2009), as these are known 
to discharge not only for our own specific actions e.g. moving our foot but also when 
witnessing others foot movements for example. (Gallase et al., 2004). Therefore the 
perceived behaviour of another could be matched to one’s own behaviour and the most 
common goals associated with it.  
Although seemingly opposite theories neither of them should be considered as 
mutually exclusive (Carrington et al., 2009). As the simulation theory could support the 
development of theory of mind and the representation of simple mental states, whilst the 
more complex aspects of mental states require additional cognitive processes which are 
conducted by the ‘theory theory’ process (Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae, 2005; 2006) 
Alternatively one theory i.e. ‘theory theory’ can be activated when the other i.e. the 
simulation theory is inappropriate or unavailable (Carrington et al., 2009). Or if one considers 
the idea of mentalising as two aspects perhaps one theory controls one component whilst the 
other is controlled by the remaining theory e.g.  ‘theory theory’ drives our cognitive ability 
whilst affective theory of mind could be linked with the ‘Simulation Theory.’ 
Developmental studies often refer to the progression of our theory of mind aptitude in 
terms of which mentalising task we can competently complete. Therefore between the ages of 
3 and 4 years old the child is considered to understand first order false belief tasks, meaning 
that they are capable of understanding that people may hold false beliefs (Mitchell & 
Lacohee, 1991; Wimmer, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). At this stage they have 
a limited repertoire of mental concepts, such as desires and perceptions (Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, 
Pervet & Kanwisher, 2004).  As the child matures their theory of mind ability becomes more 
12 
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sophisticated, by the age of 6 and 7 years old they able to complete second order false belief 
tasks and hence understand a belief about a belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1985). At this age 
there is a significant increase in the use of personality traits and they appreciate that how 
people have particular personalities which will help to predict their future actions and 
behaviours (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). At the age of nine years old a child should 
have developed complex social skills which can be illustrated by faux pas tasks (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), these tasks concern the child realising that 
the listener might not what to hear or may hurt by what is said within the story they are asked 
to read aloud (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998). At adolescence they have the ability to 
recognise emotions and mental states.  
There are clearly different levels of difficulty within our ToM ability ranging from 
our simple first-order ToM tasks to more complex faux pas tasks, between which there is of 
course the intermediate level known as second-order ToM tasks.  The ability to complete 
these different task levels obviously develops over time. Not only can the level of our ToM 
ability be measured but our ToM ability in general is often measured by a range of different 
assessment tools. These can come in the forms of simple word lists (Baron-Cohen & 
Goodhart, 1994), stories (Happe, 1994), cartoon strips (Gallagher, Happe, Brunswick, 
Flether, Frith & Frith, 2000), photographs (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Wheelwright, Bullmore, 
Brammer, Simmons & Williams, 1999) or indeed a combination of previously mentioned. 
The extent of experimental paradigms utilised to investigate ToM shall be discussed later in 
this section when considering which of the ToM tasks have been used within brain imaging 
literature. However, concentration at present turns to the task that shall be used within this 
research to measure ToM capabilities. The task which shall be administered within this paper 
was first developed by Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, and Walker (1995). 
To the best of the researchers knowledge this is the first time that this task will be 
administered within an fMRI study. The task monopolises eye gaze detection as within 
various development studies eye gaze is often referred to as a central precursor to our ToM 
ability (Baron- Cohen., 1995; Wicker, Michel, Henaff, Decety, 1998)  These studies show 
how the building blocks of direct and mutual eye gaze lead to joint and shared attention 
processes which underpin our theory of mind ability, as quite often eye gaze is used to direct 
our attention to and from others and our own objects of (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff- 
Smith, Grant & Walker, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997; Emery, 
2000).   
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With this evidence Baron-Cohen et al., (1995) developed an eye gaze preference task 
which would assess our mentalising ability, whilst minimising our executive functions. 
Endeavoured to this as it was felt that some ToM tasks not only rely on our ToM process but 
also involve our executive functioning processes. The concept behind the task is that the 
participant shall make judgements on another’s mental state from their eye gaze. However, 
this eye gaze preference task requires the development of different conditions, where one 
condition considers the individuals ToM ability whilst the other acts as the control condition, 
which the ToM condition can be compared against. The general task often consists of four 
pictures being placed on a screen, each picture belongs to a particular category (e.g. fruits) 
and each picture is positioned in one of the four corners. In the middle of the screen a cartoon 
face is displayed and at the top of the screen a sentence appears asking the participant to pick 
one of the pictures. The picture which the participant chooses depends on which condition the 
subject is within.   
Although developed by Baron-Cohen et al., in 1995 the task has been adapted 
recently in several papers. As Snowden, Gibbons, Blackshaw, Doublebay, Thompson, 
Crauford, Foster, Happe & Neary (2003) used a paper version of the task comparing a ToM 
condition task which contained a distracter arrow to a control condition. The ToM condition 
in this paper contained four pictures one in each corner and a face in the middle, the faces 
eyes were directed towards one of the four pictures and the face would be expressing a happy 
emotion e.g. smiling. The participant was asked which picture the face likes best? As well as 
this an arrow would be present on the screen pointing to one of the pictures that the face was 
not looking at, potentially distracting the participants. This display was then compared to 
their control condition which was identical to the ToM condition task except that the face 
expressed no emotion and the arrow had been removed. The participants within this study 
were also asked which picture was their favourite and assessed in terms of their ability to 
detect eye gaze direction.  
The eye gaze preference task has also been used within a variety of studies conducted 
by Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues (2005; 2007; 2007) however, within these studies the eye 
gaze task is often broken into affective and cognitive ToM tasks as well as first and second 
order ToM tasks. Within these studies the participant has be infer emotional inferences using 
eye gaze aka affective ToM and non-emotional inferences e.g. which picture is the face 
thinking of from eye gaze cues (cognitive ToM). Again as seen in Snowden et al., this study 
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develops several different ToM conditions and compares these against control conditions e.g. 
a physical task in which the participant has to purely judge the direction of the eye gaze or 
which picture the face is closest too. Within both these studies accuracy scores were recorded 
in terms of whether the individual picked the correct picture for each condition and also error 
types were considered as it was noted within Snowden et al. (2003), study that FTD patients 
frequently made the mistake of choosing their personal favourite picture.  
A variation of this eye gaze task shall be constructed to be administered within this 
paper.  Like the previous studies monopolising this task there will be three different 
conditions: a Favourite condition, a ToM condition and finally a Control condition. The 
favourite condition will assess the subjects’ personal favourite picture. Whilst the ToM task 
infers which picture the face likes best by simply using eye gaze direction and a facial 
expression of happiness. The control condition shall then simple assess the individuals’ 
ability to detect eye gaze direction, with the face showing no emotional expression. Unlike 
other ToM tasks this ToM eye gaze preference task is less structured and so more open-ended 
responses will be acquired. As in Snowden et al.(2003) and the various Shamay-Tsoory 
studies (2005; 2007; 2007) the subject will be assessed in terms of the accuracy in answering 
and their error types displayed. The ToM task within this research shall consider the first- 
order level ability of ToM processes.  
 Mentalising is clearly one of the aptitudes that governs’ our social interactions within 
the social world and one which appears to be conducted effortlessly. However, there are some 
disorders i.e. autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happe et al., 1994), schizophrenia (Brunet, 
Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000; 2003; Brune, Lissek, Fuchs, Wittaus, Peters, Nicolas 
et al., 2008), behavioural variant of Frontotemporal Dementia (bvFTD) (Lough, Kipps, 
Treise, Watson, Blair & Hodges, 2006; Snowden et al., 2003) and variants of Motor Neurone 
Disease (MND) (Goldstein & Leigh, 1999; Girandi, Mac Pherson & Abrahams, 2010), which 
postulate that the individuals with these disorders have impairments within their ToM ability. 
Within all of these disorders the individual often suffers from social and behavioural 
alterations, it has been suggested by the numerous researchers these problems can be sourced 
to impairments within ToM skills. Autistic individuals’ deficits of ToM are noted within their 
lack of social interactions, their social inappropriateness, communication deficits and 
restricted interests (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happe et al., 1996). Whilst clinical symptoms 
such as loss of volition, inertia, disinhibition and distractibility, impulsivity and perseveration 
15 
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have been noted in patients with bvFTD and MND (Neary, Snowden, Gustafson, Passant, 
Stuss, Black, 1998; Goldstein et al, 1999; Girandi et al., 2010). Patients with these diseases 
often suffer a breakdown in their social relationships and must often have no appreciation of 
their own illness and symptoms. Schizophrenia patients’ inability to mentalise is highlighted 
through their misinterpretation of social situations as they cannot perceive social and 
emotional cues (Morrison, Ohman & Dolan, 1998; Bell, Lysaker, Bryson & Kaplan, 1997).  
   
1.3 Neural Correlates of Social Cognition. 
As previously emphasised from the reviewed literature it appears that social cognition 
and the process of theory of mind is crucial for our social existence and without it or the 
appropriate level of support one can become unintentionally socially withdrawn from the rest 
of the world. Due to its importance it has often been suggested that our social cognition is 
controlled by a specific set of brain regions. Evidence for this is seen in the existence of 
individuals who appear to have no problem with the non-social world e.g. they are capable of 
difficult problem solving but find the social world confusing and foreign (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Stone & Rutherford, 1999). It then appears that the opposite of these 
individuals exist, where individuals have no problems within their social realm but instead 
their deficit lies within the non-social world perhaps within problem solving (Karmiloff- 
Smith, Grant, Bellugi & Baron-Cohen, 1995; Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990). This 
presents researchers with a functional double dissociation, as it appears that social cognition 
deficits can exist independently of non-social cognitive abilities and vice versa. Authors have 
therefore contemplated that this double dissociation could be possible due to the hypothesis 
that our social and non-social cognitive abilities are controlled by two separate brain circuits. 
This particular study is interested in which areas have been highlighted for our social 
cognition aptitudes.  
Brothers (1990) propose the idea of a social brain from primate research using single 
neurone recordings. This investigation led to various cortical regions being implicated in the 
social brain such as the amygdala (AMY), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and superior temporal 
gyrus (STG). Each of these structures was proposed to be responsible for specific social 
cognition processes, the amygdala was activated during emotional judgements, the OFC 
considers social appropriateness and finally the STG perceives faces. Brothers (1990) also 
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made reference to the inferotemporal cortical regions, including the temporal pole and the 
cingulate gyrus.  
In addition to the cortical regions mentioned above there are further regions advocated 
for our social cognition. These include the idea that the extra-striate body area governs our 
visual perception of bodies as stated in a review of fMRI studies considering the areas which 
have been noted to respond selectively to images of the human body (Downing, Jiang, 
Shuman & Kanwisher, 2001). The superior temporal sulci (STS) was found to be activated 
for the analysis of biological motion cues, which can then be used for the interpretation and 
prediction of others social intentions investigated via a PET study which compared hand and 
body motions versus object and random motions (Bonda, Petrides, Ostryi & Evans, 1996). 
The fusiform gyrus (FFG) responds during face perception and recognition as illustrated in an 
fMRI which presented faces versus common objects (Kanwisher, Mc Dermott & Chun, 
1997). Whilst the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is important for reasoning about the 
beliefs of other individuals and perhaps a wide variety of social cognitive process regarding 
intentions and mental states, (Castelli, Frith, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000). Morris, Frith, 
Perret, Rowland, Young, Calder et al., (1996) suggest that the amygdala recognises the 
emotional states of others as it was activated during an fMRI study in which they presented 
photographs of fearful and happy expressions, but it is also known to be highly 
interconnected with the cortical and subcortical areas of the brain. While the temporal parietal 
junction (TPJ) could important for attributing beliefs to others and reasoning about those 
beliefs, as Saxe and Kinwisher (2003) found activations within this regions when 
administering a story paradigm ToM task within an MRI scanner. The precuneus and the 
posterior cingulate have been identified with self knowledge as within a PET study these 
areas were highlighted for the task that reflected one’s own personal traits, when compared to 
tasks that required reflections on another’s’ personality or those that reflected social issues 
(D’Argembeu, Collette, Van der Linden, Laureys, Del Fiore, Degueldre, Luxen & Salmon, 
2005).  
1.4 Neural Correlates of Theory of Mind 
The is an overwhelming amount of research to suggest that there is neural basis for 
social cognition but the current research concentrates on the idea that there are particular 
neural regions which mediate our mentalising skill. The notion that theory of mind has its 
own neural basis has been widely speculated and often researchers debate over the hypothesis 
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that there is one particular brain region regulating this aptitude or that the process is 
underpinned by multiple brain areas. 
The enquiries made thus far into this suspicion have monopolised a range of methods 
from clinical/ lesion studies to brain imaging papers or a combination of both. Papers 
addressing this issue via clinical populations such as schizophrenia patients have used brain 
imaging techniques whilst administering ToM tasks to highlight abnormalities within the 
superior temporal lobe and temporo-parietal junction (Bebedetti, Bernasconi, Bosia, 
Cavallaro, Dallaspezia, Falini, et al., 2009), orbitofrontal/ ventromedial prefrontal region 
(Brune et al, 2008; Gold, Goldberg & Weinberg, 1992) and the left inferior frontal gyrus 
extending into the insula (Russell, Rubia, Bullmore, Soni, Suckling, Brammer, Simmon, 
William, Sharma, 2000). All of these areas have therefore been speculated as where the 
theory of mind disabilities originate from.   
Pathological changes within patients with the behavioural variant of FTD have been 
noted within the frontal lobe but as the disease progressives the brain abnormalities spread to 
some sub-cortical structures for example the parietal and temporal cortices (Neary, Snowden, 
Shields, Burjan, Northen, Macdermott, et al., 1997; Snowden et al., 2003). Often the 
predominant area of deterioration lies within the frontal lobe and is known as ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (Salmon, Garraux, Delbeuck, Collette, Zuandorf, Perani, et al., 2003). The 
autistic clinical population studies regarding this topic have been shown to have 
abnormalities within the superior temporal sulci, fusiform gyrus, the orbito prefrontal cortex, 
the amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex (Happe, Ehlers, Fletcher, Frith, Johansson, Gillerg 
et al., 1996). All of which have been speculated as areas for the theory of mind process. 
MND patients assessed using MRI  imagery were seen to have alterations to their frontal and 
temporal cortices (Abrahams, Goldstein, Suckling, Ng, Simmons, Chitnis et al., 2005).  
Lesions studies often correlate a particular lesion with a significantly inadequate ToM 
test result have highlighted some of the same regions referred to in the clinical populations. 
At times the clinical populations are often compared to particular lesion patients. Mentalising 
inabilities have been acquired after lesions within the frontal lobe (Rowe, Bullock & Polkey, 
Morris, 2001 ; Shamay- Tsoory, 2005) particular emphasised is the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Stuss, Gallup & Alexander, 2001; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Peretz & Levlovitz, 2009), 
medical prefrontal cortex (Stone et al, 1998) and the ventromedial area (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2005). Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan and Humphreys, 2005 report that following a 
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lesion within the left temporoparietal junction the patient experienced reasoning the beliefs of 
others.  
The present research centres on using the advanced technology of brain imaging to 
consider our theory of mind ability. For this reason the review of the previous research 
concerning theory of mind and brain imaging shall now be considered, as this literature has 
utilised a vast range experimental paradigms to consider our mentalising ability.  
One of the most dominant methods of assessing ToM is by assessing the participants’ 
ability to recognise mental states. Baron-Cohen et al., (1994) using this recognising mental 
abilities concept the participants were presented with two lists of words, one referring to 
mental states whilst the other reflected body parts. Subjects would judge whether the words 
were consistent with the theme of the list. The mental state list acted as the theory of mind 
task whilst the body part list reflected the control task. Using SPECT technology increased 
activations were found within the orbitofrontal cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex for the 
mental state list. Baron- Cohen et al., 1999 extended this investigation using whole brain 
analyses and a different task which involved judging various mental states from a range of 
photographs which captured the eye region. Results found that activations for this were found 
within the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), left prefrontal cortex, SMA, anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) , superior temporal sulci (STS)/superior temporal gyrus (STG), MTP, temporal 
parietal junction, amygdala and insula.  
An alternative method considering recognition of mental states was used by Mason, 
Banfield and Mancrae (2004) this involved using target words and pairing them with 
subsequent action words, the participant had to decide if the action word could be used to 
describe the target. The target words were either human or dog. The hypothesis here was that 
our theory of mind ability would be triggered only when action words were associated with 
humans, as this would automatically evoke attributions of mental states. Activations related 
to this task were found in the middle and medial frontal gyri, the right anterior cingulated 
cortex, the SMA, mPFC and the ACC. Mitchell et al., (2005) adapted this technique using a 
target- adjective pairing task, but results indicated activations in the right dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex for our mentalising skill.   
Simple questions considering mental states are an alternative mode of investigating 
ToM (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson & Yurgelun, 2003; Kozel, Revell, Lorberbaum, 
Shastri, Elhai, Horner et al., 2004; Spence, Farrow, Herford, Wilkinson, Zheng & Woodruff, 
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2001). Within these studies the individuals would often be asked to distinguish between truth 
and lies or exhibit lies and truths themselves whilst imaging took place. These various studies 
have found activation within the medial/orbital prefrontal cortex (Ganis et al., 2009; Kozel et 
al., 2004; Spence et al., 2001), lateral prefrontal regions (Spence et al., 2001), the cingulate 
cortex (Kozel et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2001) and the fusiform gyrus (Ganis et al., 2003).  
 A substantial amount of theory of mind literature has employed stories as a means of 
understanding how people attribute mental states, these tasks require the participant to infer 
various beliefs/intentions/desires from fictional characters. Happe (1994) composed three 
categories of stories investigating theory of mind, these stories were later adapted by 
Fletcher, Happe, Frith, Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak and Frith (1995). These three categories 
involved a ToM story, a physical causality story and finally one which contained unlinked 
sentences. Within these investigations the critical comparison is between the ToM and the 
physical causality story. Using PET Fletcher et al., 1995 found activations within the left 
mPFC, the ACC, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the right IPL with only the left 
MFG responding exclusively to the theory of mind condition. Gallagher et al., (2000) and 
Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery and Haxby (2007) using a simpler technique found 
activations within the medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles and temporoparietal cortex. 
However, Gobbini et al., (2007) found additional responses within the anterior and posterior 
regions of the cingulate gyrus.  
 Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herrmann, Happe, Falkai et al. in 2001 using the original 
stories designed by Happe (1994) found activations within more posterior areas, in ACC. 
This study additional considered the neural responses elicited when the subject placed 
themselves within a story.  This paper questioned if the neural responses for this condition 
would differ from that of our theory of mind. Activations for this particular condition were 
found within the ACC, the right TPJ and the medial regions of the superior parietal lobe. 
Vogeley concluded that this meant the ACC vital in contributing to our theory of mind ability 
and that different brain regions would be linked with how we assign mental states to 
ourselves. 
 Saxe et al., (2003) extended the story technique to include four conditions reflecting 
false belief, human action, non-human inferences and mechanical inferences. The theory was 
that the first two conditions represented mentalising and results indicated that these two tasks 
provoked activations in the anterior STS and the TPJ. In a later study analysing whole brain 
20 
3013747  Neural Basis 
activity and comparing false belief stories and false photographs were found to activate the 
right medial superior frontal gyrus and the frontal pole (Saxe et al., 2003). This study 
provided further sustenance an earlier ERP study by Sabbagh and Taylor (2000) which 
implicated the left frontal lobe as a site of theory of mind abilities.  
 Thus far the tasks assessing theory of mind have involved different verbal capabilities 
however there are papers analysing mentalising through a non-verbal means. For instance 
static images have been manipulated to reflect theory of mind abilities within various brain 
imaging techniques. Some of the static images reflect the same basic idea as seen for the 
story studies, hence they involve a theory of mind image, a physical causality image and an 
image one made up of jumbled pictures. With this task neural responses were seen in the 
medical prefrontal cortex (mPFC) bilaterally, the right precuneus and fusiform gyrus (FFG) 
(Gallagher et al., 2000). Further non-verbal tests can be seen in the form of the well known 
Sally-Ann format, in which one cartoon depicts a change in location of an object, the change 
is made either with (true belief) or without (false belief) the critical protagonists awareness 
(Sommer, Dohnel, Sodian, Meinhardt, Thoermer & Hajak, 2007). These false belief cartoons 
have evoked heightened activity in several regions, the dorsal ACC, the PFC and the right 
TPJ (Sommer et al., 2007). Authors have suggested that the ACC and the PFC had non-roles 
and that the only region of importance was the TPJ which is specific for ToM abilities. 
Lissek, Peters, Fuchs, Wittaus, Nicholas, Tegenthoff et al. (2008) considered ToM in the 
same manner and evoked neural activity in the superior, inferior and medial regions of the 
PFC, the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex), the temporal parietal junction, precuneus and 
insula. 
Comic strips depicting theory of mind paradigms have been used in a number of 
studies (Brunet et al., 2000; Ciaramidaro, Adenzato, Enrici, Erk, Pia, Bara et al., 2007; 
Vollm, Taylor, Richardson, Corcoran, Stirling, McKie, Deakin & Elliot, 2006; Walter, 
Adenzato, Ciaramido, Enrici, Pia & Bara, 2004). These paradigms typically highlighted areas 
in the medial and inferior areas of the right PFC including the ACC, anterior temporal regions 
bilaterally and the left cerebellum when the theory of mind condition was compared to the 
physical causality condition (Brunet et al., 2000). Vollm et al. 2006 conducted research with 
this particular task showing activations in the medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal regions, the 
TPJ and the temporal cortex.  
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Walter et al., (2004) using a similar cartoon format to Vollm et al., (2006)  but with 
the addition of another character, the additional character meant the participants had to 
distinguish between the private intentions of one character and private intentions of two 
characters and communicative intentions. This study as well as noting the typical areas within 
the PFC also implicated the PCC (paracingulate cortex) as being engaged in the processing of 
mental states, specifically when these intentions were associated with social interactions. 
Ciaramidaro et al., investigating the same idea of private intentions and possible social 
intentions also demonstrated activations within the anterior paracingulate.  
There are a few studies that have considered the idea that there could be differences 
between the evoked activations found in theory of mind story tasks and cartoon tasks.  
Gallagher et al., (2000) found that independent of these modalities, theory of mind tasks 
activated the medial prefrontal cortex bilaterally. However, Kobyashi, Glover and Temple 
(2007) failed to replicate this finding, although within this study there were a number of 
adjustments to how the stimuli were presented to the subjects. This study noted how there 
appeared to be a more activation in the left STG and the right MTG for the story tasks. While 
modality- independent activation was found in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as more 
posterior regions which included the right IPL and bilateral TPJ. Further analysis using the 
technique of region of interest analysis implicated the TPJ bilaterally and the right IPL as 
specific for theory of mind compared with both modalities. The two groups concluded that 
there are regions in the brain which are associated with mentalising regardless of verbal task 
demands that the mPFC and the TPJ. Kobayashi, et al (2007) also examined age within their 
study with results finding both age groups showed significant activity in the TPJ bilaterally 
and right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) in a modality independent manner.  
Photographs are an alternative method of non-verbal tasks used to research theory of 
mind brain activations. One typical way in which photographs have been used involves 
presenting the photograph and asking the participant to simply make judgments of whether 
the face is happy or not, this neural activate was then compared to neural responses evoked 
when asked to judge if face in the photograph is symmetrical. Activations for these studies 
have been found in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the TPJ in the STS and the left 
amygdala (Mitchell et al., 2005). An additional condition was added debating if the face was 
similar to the subjects face, results show a negative correlation found between the 
dorsomedial PFC and the a positive correlation between in the ventromedial PFC (Mitchell et 
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al., 2005). Mosconi, Mack, Mc Carthy and Pelphrey (2005) combined animations and videos 
to consider the concept of theory of mind, finding increased activation in the posterior STS, 
the middle temporal gyrus and the IPL of the right hemisphere. This was one study that did 
not activate the medial prefrontal cortex. Goel, Grafman, Sadato and Hallett (1995) 
researching theory of mind evoked excitation for ToM within the orbitofrontal region.  
Calarge, Andreson and O’Leary (2003) using PET and a paradigm concerned to be 
more ecologically valid than previous research as it involved the participants inventing and 
placing themselves within various imagery encounters with strangers. This study produced 
neural responses within the left medial, superior and inferior frontal regions, the anterior, para 
and retrocingulate which extended bilaterally, the angular gyrus, temporal pole and the right 
cerebellum. Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff and Frith (2002) using a computer game task to 
assess theory of mind capabilities found activation within the frontal region and the 
paracingulate. 
The majority of the studies mentioned have considered the idea of theory of mind 
using either false belief (first order or second order) or faux pas test. However, there are 
investigations which use the mental state of deception to investigate theory of mind, as 
deception does require the subject to consider others beliefs in the same way a false belief 
task might. Plus the act of deceiving another person involves the intentional manipulation of 
those beliefs. Activations for deception studies have been found in the frontal cortex which 
includes the orbitofrontal cortex and frontal gyrus, in the anterior cingulate and in superior 
temporal and cerebellar regions (Kozel et al., 2004).  
Just as deception is considered to assess theory of mind so too does the idea of 
intentions and empathy.  Authors that have considered the idea of intentions are Brunet et al., 
2000; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallase, Buccino, Mazziotta and 
Rizzolatti, 2005; Mosconi et al., 2005; Vollm et al., 2006; Walter et al., 2004) these various 
studies have illuminated the mPFC, the ACC, and the superior temporal regions as involved 
in theory of mind. Vollm et al., (2006) considered which areas of activity overlapped for 
empathy and theory of mind tasks, overlap illustrated in the medial prefrontal, orbitofrontal 
regions, the TPJ and the middle and inferior temporal regions. When separately considered 
intentions saw greater response within more lateral frontal cortex and in more superior 
temporal regions. 
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Carrington and Bailey (2009) in a review of neuroimaging literature noted how out of 
40 studies 35 paper noted activation with the medial prefrontal cortex, 35% of the studies 
included the LPFC as an area involved in theory of mind. Eight out the forty papers 
mentioned the SMA while 5 papers referenced the orbitofrontal cortex. The motor cortex 
responded in one study considering ToM, the ACC was found to be activated in 15 out of 40 
papers. 25% of the research reviewed included the paracingulate as relevant to out ToM 
ability. The precuneus was noted to produce neural excitation in 28% of the paper, whilst 
15% of the papers reported PCC and IPL activations (not necessarily the same papers). Ten 
out of forty papers elicited activation in the temporal poles and the cerebellum, whilst 45% 
noted how the STS/STG and TPJ were associated with mentalising. A further 20 % found 
neural responses in the MTG, occipital lobe and fusiform gyrus. While 5 papers found 
activation in the amygdala and 5 found activation in the Insula. 
It is clear from the brain imaging literature that a variety of tests have been used to 
investigate the neural correlates of theory of mind. It is not surprising then that from these 
studies a number of areas have been referenced as important for our mentalising aptitude. Of 
course the variations of brain regions mentioned could be due to the various experimental 
paradigms. But the variation has also been linked with whether the individual has been 
explicitly told to consider the other individuals mental state. As although generally assumed 
that theory of mind is an automatic process there are studies which have suggested otherwise 
(Apperly , Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson, 2006). The variety as also been blamed on 
the diverse number of mental states that have been studied e.g. false belief, deception and 
intentions. As even within false belief studies there has been different neural responses 
elicited for first and second false belief tasks.  
From the literature considered it appears that our ToM aptitude could be sub-served 
by a variety of brain regions. However, there are often areas which researchers pinpoint as 
being the core region for ToM. One of these regions is the PFC in particular the mPFC/ OFC 
regions (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle and Decety, 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et 
al., 2000; Happe et al., 1996; Vogeley et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002; Goel et al., 1995) 
and only four studies thus far have failed to activate this area when considering ToM. 
Theorists suggest that since the PFC is a large area of the brain and since it has a series of 
intimate connections with other brain areas (the anterior insula, temporal pole, inferior 
parietal region and the amygdala), these two characteristic allow for it to in a position to 
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evaluate and regulate incoming information which can consequently be used to inhibit 
behaviour, regular emotions and empathise with the experiences of others. Therefore this area 
could be the most appropriate for the integration of the vast amounts of social information 
required for our mentalising capability. A further hypothesis is that this large area could be 
split into different abilities regarding our theory of mind ability. As perhaps the right 
orbitofrontal medial temporal circuit involved in processing others mental states on 
immediate information and the left medial frontal circuit is involved in more complex 
reasoning.   
However, evidence from a lesion study noted how even when an individual who 
sustained profound damage to their prefrontal cortex was still able to complete theory of 
mind tasks (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith & Husain, 2001).  Due to these studies a shadow of 
doubt has cast on the mPFC/OFC ability to conduct our ToM processes.  Some theorists have 
alternatively suggested that the core area for our theory of mind capabilities is the TPJ (Saxe 
et al., 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Stating how this area is where reasoning about others 
beliefs takes place. It appears that this region is also involved in non-social tasks that require 
participants to redirect attention to task-relevant stimuli. (Saxe et al, 2003). 
But the fact remains that a variety of studies have also found activation within more 
peripheral areas, such as the amygdala, STS and the anterior and para-cingulate cortex. 
Gallagher and Frith (2003) reviewed mentalising brain imaging research and suggested that 
the mPFC, temporal poles and the STS are involved in the processes required for mentalising. 
Stating that perhaps the mPFC is more vital for this ability whilst the STS and temporal poles 
are less uniquely involved in the process.  
It seems unlikely that one region alone accounts for our ability to mentalise, instead it 
may be more adequate to theorise that these is a neural circuit within the social brain 
governing our ToM capacity. Therefore perhaps a variety of the brain regions mentioned are 
indeed involved such as the mPFC, TPJ, STS/STG and the temporal poles to allow us to 
competently complete all aspects of mentalising. Perhaps there is even some interconnected 
regions underlying our theory of mind, as evidence suggests that some white matter lesions 
have lead to a disturbance with our theory of mind (Bach, Davis, Calvin, Wijerante, Happe, 
Howard et al., 1998; Happe, Malhi & Checkley, 2001).  
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1.5 Present Study 
The main aim of this study is to pilot the eye gaze preference task within an fMRI 
environment, to ensure that this task can used within future brain imaging research. As well 
as this the study hopes to speculate on which areas of the brain are relate to our ToM ability 
when using a simple eye gaze preference task.  
In order for the eye gaze preference task to run efficiently within an fMRI study the 
task has to have certain time restrictions for when and how long the subject has to respond 
with their answer. To ensure that it was possible for participants to answer within these time 
constraints a pilot study shall be performed using the identical time restraints that are set out 
by an fMRI study. Therefore the pilot study’s main aim will be to ensure that the participant 
can appropriately answer within these time restraints. This study shall be analysed and found 
successful if the participants are able to respond to each of the tasks and accuracy levels for 
all conditions are high. It is predicted that the controls will have no problems with assessing 
which picture the face likes best, nor should there be any deficits with detecting the eye gaze 
direction, as all participants within this study shall be ‘healthy’ controls with normal ToM 
capabilities. If any errors do occur they shall be classified as seen in Snowden et al., 2003 as 
either favourite errors or unclassified errors.  
If completed adequately the task shall be administered within an MRI scanner. 
Within the fMRI study the objective is to ensure that the task is eliciting brain activations that 
differ to that of the baseline, therefore the task can be used as a ToM task within further fMRI 
studies. This study is also interested in whether there are any differences in the neural 
activations elicited during the ToM task when compared to the control condition and the 
favourite condition. Just as in the pilot study the participants within this study are considered 
to be healthy controls therefore none of the subjects should have difficulties with any of the 
task conditions, in fact accuracy scores should be almost perfect. When comparing the neural 
emissions for each task condition against each other it is hoped that one would find increased 
BOLD activations for the ToM condition within the mPFC/ OFC and TPJ as these two 
regions mentioned as two crucial areas within ToM literature (Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe et 
al., 2003). There may also be some activations in the amygdala due to the emotion expressed 
on the face (Morris et al., 1996) and perhaps activations within the STS/STG as these areas 
are associated with detection of eye gaze direction (Itier & Batty, 2009).  
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2. Method 
2.1 Experiment One: Pilot study: Off line 
2.1.1 Participants. 
Eight healthy individuals, 7 females and 1 male were asked to take part in this 
experiment. Their ages ranged from 23 years old to 60 years old, with an average of 40.5 
years old. Before commencing the experiment the participants were deemed ‘healthy’ 
through questions concerning their medical history and assessing their IQ via the Wechsler 
Test of Adult Reading neurological assessment (WTAR; Weschler 2001) this prevented any 
conflicting results obtained due to medication, medical conditions or intellectual ability. The 
four older subjects were randomly selected from a volunteer panel supplied by the University 
of Edinburgh, whilst the younger participants were all students who attended the University 
of Edinburgh. All subjects received information concerning the research via interactions with 
the researcher and information sheets. Each participant gave formal written consent to 
partake in the study.  
 2.1.2 Stimuli 
 Information sheets, consent forms (see appendix 1) and three separate recording 
sheets were constructed for each task condition (Favourite, theory of mind and control 
condition (see appendix 2, 3 and 4)).  
 As mentioned in the introduction the task developed for this experiment was 
originally constructed as a paper version by Baron-Cohen et al., (1995). The concept behind 
the task is that the participant is required to make preference judgements based on eye gaze 
cues. Unlike the original task this paper constructed a computerised version of the eye gaze 
task within E-Prime (E-Prime, 2000). As set out in the introduction the task will have three 
different conditions: the Favourite condition, ToM condition and the Control condition. The 
favourite condition in this experiment is considered to be a pre-experimental condition as its 
purpose is to assess the individuals’ personal favourite picture, controlling for errors that 
could occur in the experimental conditions due to the individual simply picking their 
favourite.  The ToM and Control condition are referred to as the experimental conditions. The 
ToM condition allowed the researcher to assess the participants’ ability to infer the mental 
state of another using an eye gaze cue. The control condition assessed the subjects’ ability to 
detect eye gaze direction, these two conditions were then assessed within the results.  
27 
3013747  Neural Basis 
Each of the task conditions consisted of 10 blocks with 5 trials per block. Each 
condition ran consecutively, with the favourite condition running first followed by the ToM 
condition and finally the Control condition. Each of the subjects was presented with the task 
conditions in the same sequence as previously mentioned. The trials in each condition were 
separated with fixation crosses which appeared on the screen for 500 milliseconds. The 
experimental conditions’ (ToM and the control condition) blocks were interspersed with 17 
second rest periods. For each of the task conditions the participants would say which of the 
pictures they were choosing.  
The task for each of the conditions consisted of presenting the participant with a 
screen, on which there is four pictures belonging to the same category (fruits, animals, 
vegetables, household items and cartoons), the pictures were positioned in one of four corners 
of the computer screen (upper left, upper right, bottom left and bottom right). For the pre-
experimental favourite condition, a text box at the top of the screen read “Which picture is 
your favourite.” An example of the stimuli used in this condition can be found in figure 1. To 
move between the trials in this condition the participants simply pressed the space bar on the 
key board.  
 
 
Figure 1: An example of the stimuli presented in the favourite condition for experiment one.  
The experimental task conditions not only seen the four pictures presented but also 
displayed a face in the middle of the screen. Within the ToM condition the face would be 
expressing an emotion i.e. smiling, whilst in the control condition the face had no emotional 
expression. At the top of the screen in the ToM condition the sentence asked “Which picture 
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does the face like best?” and for the control condition the sentence said “Which picture is the 
face looking at?”  
Although each condition required the participant to verbally respond with their 
answer the two experimental conditions stipulated that this was done at a specific time and 
within a time frame of four seconds. These time restraints were set as these matched the time 
constraints of the fMRI design which the eye gaze preference task would eventually be used 
within. To indicate when the subject should give their answers within the experimental 
conditions the face that was presented in the middle of the screen would change colour from 
yellow to green, staying green for four seconds.  
To construct the ToM condition within E-prime a duplicate of the E-Prime 
programme for the favourite task was made. A smiling yellow face was then added to the 
middle of the screen for each of the trials. The faces were selected in a pseudo-random 
manner, so that the face would be looking at one of the four picture locations an equal 
number of times. To create the illusion that the face was changing from yellow to green, a 
copy of screen containing the yellow face was created and added to the E-Prime trial 
procedure. It was programmed to appear directly after the task screen that contained the 
yellow face.  In the coped task screen the yellow faces were changed to their green 
counterpart. The task screen containing the yellow face was then programmed to show for 2.1 
seconds whilst the task screen containing the green face was displayed for four seconds. An 
example of the ToM condition task can be seen in figures 2 and 3.  
 
 
Figure 2: An example of the stimuli presented in the ToM condition, showing the yellow face which 
was programmed for 2.1 seconds. 
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Figure 3: An example of the stimuli presented in ToM condition, showing the green face which was 
programmed for 4 seconds. 
The task for the control condition was constructed by duplicating the E-Prime 
programme for the ToM condition, two small adjustments were then made after copying. One 
adjustment was made to the text box which now read “Which picture is the face looking at?” 
The second alteration was that the smiling faces were replaced by their neutral face 
counterparts. The task for the control condition is depicted in figure 4 and 5 below. 
To construct the different task conditions various materials were required i.e. the faces 
and pictures which were presented within each of the tasks. The faces were created using 
Paint (Microsoft Office, 2007), each face was a simple circle which contained a set of eyes 
and a mouth, the eyes were made using two circles with black dots and the smiles were either 
curved or straight lines also created in Paint (Microsoft Office, 2007.) Four yellow faces were 
constructed displaying smiles and these four faces had their eyes looking at one of the four 
different locations. Duplicates of these four faces were then made but this time the face were 
green. A further four yellow faces were made displaying a neutral expression and each of the 
faces eyes were directed towards one of the four different locations. Duplicates were then 
made of these but instead of the faces being yellow they were green.  
The pictures for the tasks were sourced through an internet search using basic five 
categories (fruits, vegetables, household items, cartoons and animals), totalling to 120 
pictures. (See Appendix 5). 
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Figure 4: An example of the stimuli presented in the control condition, showing the yellow face. 
 
 
Figure 5: An example of the stimuli presented in the control condition, showing the green face. 
2.1.3 General Procedure 
Testing took place in the psychology building at the University of Edinburgh. On 
arrival the participants were greeted by the researcher and were given information sheets and 
consent forms to read and complete before testing commenced, this ensured that they fully 
understood the study. After formal consent was obtained the individuals were informally 
questioned concerning their medical history and administered the WTAR assessment 
(Weschler, 2001). 
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Subjects were then informed that the tasks were computer based and located on the 
laptop in front of them and that instructions for each task would be presented prior to the task 
beginning. The tasks for each condition were administered in the same sequence for each 
subject, starting with the favourite condition, followed by some practice trials for the ToM 
condition, then the ‘real’ ToM condition and finally the control condition task.   
2.1.3.1 Favourite Condition procedure 
The researcher informed the participant that this task condition involved naming each 
of the pictures that appeared on the screen and saying which picture was their favourite. 
Individuals were reminded that instructions would appear on the screen and they were 
informed to ask questions about the task through instructions. The instructions administered 
to participants for this condition can be located in appendix 6. After the instructions appeared 
the task procedure would follow.  
2.1.3.2 Practice Procedure 
Once the favourite condition was complete the participants were made aware that they 
were now going to complete a practice task for the second condition before performing the 
actual task. They were reminded to ask questions throughout the instructions as this task was 
now timed and asking throughout the task could be detrimental to their response. The 
researcher then commenced the practice task and participants were introduced to the face 
which would be seen throughout the next two conditions. The participants were informed that 
as well as viewing four pictures on screen, they would now see a face appearing in the middle 
of the screen. It was their task to infer which picture the face liked best. They were instructed 
to answer this question by verbally responding when the face in the middle turned green. 
They were asked to pay close attention as the task was timed and they would have to respond 
as quickly as possible when indicated. Subjects were asked to remain silent at all other times 
throughout the task except for when responding to give answer. Full instructions for this 
practice trial can be found in appendix 6. Once instructions were complete the task would 
commence and follow the E-Prime procedure of trials interspersed with fixation crosses as 
well having 17 second rest periods between each of the blocks.  
If subjects responded whilst the face was still yellow they were reminded to wait until 
the face was green to say answer.  
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Once complete and if the researcher was satisfied with their performance on the task, 
they were informed that they would be starting the real task and that this would follow the 
same protocol and procedure as seen in the practice task. 
2.1.3.3 Theory of Mind Condition Procedure 
Full instructions for this task can be found in appendix 6. The task followed the same 
procedure as seen in the practice task.  
2.1.3.4 Control Condition Procedure 
Instructions for this condition were the same as those presented in the ToM condition, 
except that the subjects were asked to consider which picture the face was looking at. Full 
instructions for this task can be found in appendix 10. Task procedure for this condition is the 
same as outlined in practice ToM task.  
2.1.4 Design 
The task design for this experiment was a block paradigm. There were three 
conditions known as: Favourite condition, ToM condition and the Control condition. Each 
condition contained ten blocks with five trials in each block. Each condition ran 
consecutively, with the naming/favourite condition running first, followed by the ‘like best’ 
condition and finally running in full the ‘looking at’ condition. The experimental design is 
known as a within subject design as repeated measurements were taken from each participant.   
2.1.5 Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was granted by both the NHS ethic committee and the University of 
Edinburgh’s ethical committee.  Each participant was informed that they could withdraw at 
any stage throughout the experiment and formal consent was obtained prior to taking part in 
research. They were given a full debriefing after the experiment was complete.    
2.2 Results from Pilot study 
This experiment was interested in the accuracy scores for the two experimental 
conditions and what type of errors were made through these task conditions. Displayed in 
Table 1 are the raw accuracy scores collected for each participant for the ToM condition and 
the control task condition, as well as the subjects’ age. Table 2 illustrates the averages and 
standard deviations of the group concerning their age and total accuracy scores within the 
ToM task condition and the control condition. Analysis was conducted to assess if there was 
a significant difference between the accuracy scores for the ToM condition and the control 
condition. A non- parametric Mann- Whitney U test was conducted due to the small number 
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of participants and due to ceiling effects. Results indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the groups’ mean accuracy score obtained in the theory of mind condition 
and the control condition, U= 28.00, n1=n2=8, P =0.721.   
Table 1: Raw accuracy scores for each participant for both experimental conditions and the 
participants’ ages.  
Participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age (years) 50 58 60 52 23 25 27 24 
ToM 
condition 
50 50 48 50 50 50 50 50 
Control 
condition 
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for the group concerning age and accuracy scores for each 
of the experimental conditions.  
 Age ToM condition Control 
condition 
Mean (S.D) 45.87 (2.69) 49.75 (0.71) 50 (0.00) 
 
 
As noted from Table 1 there was one individual who made two errors, neither of 
which were favourite errors therefore they were deemed unclassified errors.  
The aim for this experiment was to ensure that the task could be run within a 
particular time restraints. These time restraints were set out to mimic the time constraints one 
would find within an fMRI study. It is evident from the results that this is indeed plausible, as 
the healthy controls were able to respond accurately for both task conditions within the time 
restraints stipulated. Therefore further investigations were constructed to implement the eye 
gaze preference task designed within this experiment into an MRI scanner, to obtain 
functional images of activations elicited during this particular task.   
2.3 Experiment Two: fMRI study  
2.3.1 Participants. 
Six healthy individuals we asked to partake in this research, their ages ranged between 
40 and 61 years old, with an average age of 51.8 years old. There were 4 females and 1 male. 
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Unfortunately one individuals’ data was disregarded due to slight abnormalities found within 
the brain when scanned. The participants were recruited from a volunteer panel from the 
University of Edinburgh, with criteria simply being healthy 40-60 year old individuals. This 
age range was recruited as these subjects would form a control comparison group to patients 
with MND and FTD. Each participant was assessed and declared ‘healthy’ using a brief 
interview concerning their medical history, administering the WTAR neurological assessment 
(Weschler, 2001) and by completing the hospital anxiety and depression scale questionnaire 
(Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). All subjects received information relating to the research 
through communication with the researcher and information sheets, after which formal 
consent was obtained. Participants were tested and scanned at the SFC Brain Imaging 
Research Centre (www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk), Division of Clinical Neurosciences, University of 
Edinburgh, a core area of the Wellcome Trust Clinical Research facility and part of the 
SINAPSE (Scottish Imaging Network- A platform of Scientific Excellence) collaboration 
(www.sinapse.ac.uk) funded by the Scottish Funding Council and the chief Scientists Office.    
2.3.2 Stimulus. 
 Information sheets and consent forms were constructed detailing the same 
information as in experiment one but including information concerning the scanning 
procedure and safety requires (see appendix 7). Screening scanning forms were obtained 
from the SFC Brain Imaging Research Centre (www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk) at the Western General 
Hospital and administered to the subjects to ensure each participant was eligible for scanning 
(see appendix 8).  
The same task conditions and hence the same stimuli were used within this 
experiment as seen in experiment one. However, this time the favourite condition would be 
considered not just an experimental condition, the task conditions were programmed using 
Presentation (http://www.neurobs.com/) equipment instead of E-Prime.  
Since the favourite condition was not administered within experiment one as having 
time restraints a few alterations were made to the task condition. This was simply done to by 
adding an additional image to the middle of the screen to indicate to the participants when to 
give their answer. The image that was added was a simple ball which was created in Word 
(Microsoft Office, 2007), this ball was programmed in the same way as the faces seen within 
the ToM and the control condition.  Therefore, task screen containing a yellow circle would 
appear for 2.1 seconds after which it was replaced by an identical task screen that now 
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contained a green circle which was presentation for four seconds. An example of the task 





Figure 6: An example of the stimuli used in the favourite condition for the fMRI study, showing a 
yellow ball.  
 
 
Figure 7: An example of the stimuli used within the favourite condition for the fMRI study, showing the 
green ball. 
Since the favourite condition within experiment one ensured not only that participants 
favourite picture was noted but that each of the subjects could name the pictures that were 
presented within the tasks. There was a pre-experimental task constructed for this experiment 
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to assess the participants naming capabilities for each of the pictures. It was a simple paper 
task which seen eight portrait A4 pages, containing each of the stimuli pictures, 15 pictures 
per page. The researcher simple asked the subjects to name each of the pictures, checking 
each one off and recording the response if somehow different from the researchers name.  
Additional equipment was required for use in experiment two as when within the 
scanner for the tasks to be visible to the participant they required the use of binoculars 
(http://nordicneurolab.com/) which would be adjusted for their specific requirements. As well 
as this the responses given by each participant had to be recorded using a microphone 
compatible with the MRI machinery. This equipment was funded through the SINAPSE 
collaboration (www.sinapse.ac.uk). The microphone was programmed in line with the 
various tasks to record for the four seconds that the face or ball was green. Hence at this stage 
no scanning was taking place and the scanner would have been quite.   
2.3.3 Procedure 
The participants were greeted by the researcher on arrival to the MRI unit at the 
Western General Hospital. At this stage they were taken through to an office area within the 
MRI unit where the researcher informed them that they would have some assessments and 
forms to complete, after which the radiologist will come through to go over the screening 
scan form with them. The subjects were given an information sheet and consent form to read 
and complete before testing. They were then asked to complete a screening scanning form for 
the experimenters’ records and for the radiologists. The participants were then asked if they 
had any questions concerning the study. Finally they were asked to complete the Hospital and 
Anxiety questionnaire (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) before the WTAR assessment (Weschler, 
2001) was administered to them.  
Once all the correct forms were complete and initial assessments complete, the 
researcher informed the participant that they were now going to complete the first task which 
was straightforward and simple. They were going to see a number of pictures, these pictures 
would be appear in the tasks that they would complete within the scanner. They were asked 
to name each of the pictures and whilst the researcher noted their responses. The aim here 
was to ensure that they could name each of the pictures. Once this task was complete the 
researcher informed the radiologist that they had finished with pre-assessment and the subject 
was ready for the safety procedure information.  
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The radiologist would check through each of the questions noted in the screening scan 
form with the individual, once qualified as being safe to take part in fMRI scan the 
participant would be taken through to scanner. The radiologist would proceed with fixing the 
individual into position. This included ensuring they were comfortable, the binoculars were 
appropriately positioned, the microphone was tapped into place and controlling for any 
movements.   
 2.3.3.1 Favourite Procedure 
 The instructions for each condition were displayed prior to the task itself, the 
participants were asked to inform the radiologists once they were finished with the 
instructions as they would move the instructions forward from control room. Once all 
instructions were complete the radiologist checked that participant understood the 
instructions. After instructions they were given 5 practise trials concerning the task. They 
were then asked if they understood the task. Once competent in the task the real task began. 
 2.3.3.2 Theory of Mind Procedure 
Once the first task condition was complete the participant was informed that they 
would now see further instructions for the next task. Reminded to let radiologist know once 
they had finished instructions as these would be moved forward by individual in control 
room. Once instructions complete they were informed that task would start shortly.  The task 
would then run and followed the same procedure as the theory of mind task seen in 
experiment one.  
 2.3.3.3 Control Condition Procedure 
Same procedure as above condition was followed. Except that once complete the 
subject was informed that tasks were now complete but as discussed a further scan is being 
obtained, therefore remain still and silent whilst noise continues around you.  
2.2.7 Ethical Issues 
 Ethical approval was granted by both the NHS ethic committee and the University of 
Edinburgh’s ethical committee. Each participant was informed that they could withdraw from 
the study at any stage throughout the experiment and formal consent was obtained prior to 
commencing experiment. Since this experiment involved an fMRI participants were screened 
before scanning took place ensuring they were eligible for scanning and healthy and safety 
requirements were followed. After the experiment was complete the participants were fully 
debriefed. 
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2.1.4 Task Design 
During the scanning phrase, instructions and the tasks were presented visually via 
binoculars (http://www.nordicneurolab.com/) using Presentation software ( 
http://www.neurobs.com/). 
Each condition was presented in separated fMRI sessions using an alternating block 
design (task vs. rest). The participants were presented with each of the conditions within the 
same sequence, as each of the conditions ran consecutively, with the Favourite condition 
running first, followed by the ToM condition and finally the Control condition. Each 
condition contained ten blocks with 5 trials per block. Each block condition lasted for 9.14 
minutes, with each activation block lasting 52.8 seconds, resting block lasting 19.8 seconds 
.Each trial lasted 6.6 seconds long and consisted of a fixation cross presented for 500 
milliseconds following by the task screen displayed for 2.1 seconds. This task screen then 
changed (face would change from yellow to green) to indicate to the participant to give their 
verbal response, during this time the scanner was quite and they had 4 seconds to give their 
answer (spare sampling acquisition). In addition to brain activity being monitored using 
fMRI, the participants’ responses were recorded to measure their accuracy and error type. 
The response was recorded using an MRI compatible microphone and the recording period 
lasted 4 seconds. As mentioned earlier, no data were acquired during this period allowing 
participants to verbally respond whiles minimizing MRI motion artefacts.  
 2.2.5 Data Acquisition 
 The imaging work was carried out on a GE 1.5T MRI Signa Horizon scanner at the 
Scottish Brain Imaging Research Centre (http://www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk/). Following a clinical T2 
weighted anatomical image ensuring a absence of brain abnormalities in participants, T2* 
EPI data (TA= 2600ms; TR=6600ms; TE= 40ms; flip angle=90º; field of view (FOV)= 
240mm; matrix size = 64×64; voxel size = 3.75*3.75; number of slices= 30; slice 
thickness=5mm, interleaved acquisition)  with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
contrast were collected parallel to the anterior / posterior commissural plane. Finally, a T1 
weighted inversion pulse recovery image was collected (TE= Min full; flip angle=8º; slice 
thickness=1.3mm; FOV= 240 mm; number of slices= 160; matrix= 192 × 192) at the end of 
the scanning session. Duration of the scanning was approximately an hour long. 
Functional images were acquired over three functional sessions corresponding to the 
three different tasks (favourite, ToM and control) with a total of 84 images.  Per session (9.14 
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minutes) with the 4 first volumes disregarded prior to analysis to allow for T1 saturation 
effects.  
2.2.6 Data Preprocessing 
Data were analysed on a Linux workstation using SPM8 implemented in MATLAB®. 
Slice timing correction was applied to correct for differences occurring within the images due 
to acquisition delay between each slice using the 15
th
 slice as reference slice. Images were 
next realigned to correct for 3D movements (default parameters and 4th degree B-spline 
interpolation) and normalised to the ICBM space template of the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (4th degree B-spline interpolation – final voxel size 2x2x2 mm) using parameters 
obtained via subjects coregistered T1/mean EPI images. Finally, prior statistical analyses, 
data were smoothed using an 8 mm full width at half- maximum (FWHM) isotopic Gaussian 
kernel.  
 2.2.7 Data Analysis 
 Statistical analysis was carried out using the general linear model with  boxcar 
functions convolved by the canonical hemodynamic response function in order to model each 
activation block. A design matrix was specified in the first level analysis for each individual 
with 3 sessions, each one including a regressor of the activation blocks (favourite, ToM and 
control depending on the session), a parametric exponential (time) expansion and finally 
motion parameters. In addition data were high-pass filtered with a cut off at 128sec and low 
passed via a 1
st
 order autoregressive model. After fitting the GLM, beta parameters for each 
regressors were obtained and incorporated within the second level analysis.  
For the group analysis (random effects), beta parameters of each subjects were 
entered into two separate repeated measure ANOVA. For each ANOVA the three tasks were 
compared through planned contrasts between the ToM and Control tasks and between the 
ToM and Favourite tasks. In the 1
st
 ANOVA, parameters modelling each of the tasks were 
used whereas in the second ANOVA, parameters modelling the time effect in each of the 
tasks were used. Given the small sample analyzed (N=5), a voxel was deemed significant for 
p values < 0.01 uncorrected. In addition, a cluster size of more than 10 contiguous voxels was 
applied.   
Results were visualized on the averaged 152 T1 template and activation labelling obtained 
using the  anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005, 2006 
(http://www.fzjuelich.de/ime/spm_anatomy_toolbox.) which is based on observer – 
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independent cytoarchitectonic analysis of 10 post mortem brains to provide stereotaxic 
information on the location and variability of the cortical areas in the MNI space. Figures are 
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3. Results 
 This section analyses the data that was obtained during the scanning study. Analysis 
considering the accuracy scores for the ToM condition and control condition was conducted 
on PASW 17.0, with the significant level set P<0.05 (2-tailed).  
3.1. Accuracy scores Analysis. 
 Table 3 illustrates the raw accuracy scores for each participant within the two task 
conditions (ToM and control). Table 4 depicts the average and standard deviations for the 
group concerning their age and accuracy scores for the two task conditions (ToM and 
control).  
Table 3: Raw scores for the ToM condition, control condition and participants' ages.  
Participants 1 2 3 4 5 
Age (years) 50 52 56 61 40 
ToM 
condition 
49 50 50 49 50 
Control 
condition 
50 50 50 50 50 
 
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations for the group concerning age, ToM condition and control 
condition.  
 Age ToM condition Control 
condition 
Mean (S.D) 51.8 (7.82) 49.6 (0.55) 50 (0.00) 
 
The mean accuracy scores for the two task conditions were compared using a non-
parametric significance test as there were only a small number of participants and ceiling 
effects within the two conditions, this was to analysis if the mean accuracy score in the ToM 
condition significantly differed from the accuracy score in the control condition.  Results 
indicate that there is no significant difference between the mean accuracy score for ToM and 
control task condition U= -7.5, n1=n2=5, P=0.721. As shown in Table 3 there were two 
individuals who made errors within the ToM condition, whilst no errors were made on the 
control condition. These errors occurred at different trials within the ToM task and were 
noted as being favourite errors.   
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3.2 Functional Imaging Analysis   
3.2.1 Overall ANOVA (all conditions vs. baseline) 
An overall ANOVA was conducted to analyse all the task conditions versus the 
baseline, this contrast showed that there was a significant difference in BOLD responses in 
the inferior parietal cortex, right insula lobe and the left hippocampus when compared to the 
baseline. (see figure 5 and table 6). For a full list of activations please see appendix… 












Height threshold: F= 8.65, P=0.01 (uncorrected); extent threshold: k= 10 voxels. 
 
 MNI coordinates    
Area of 
activation 





40 -38 32 4.06 52.89 274 
Right insula 
lobe 






50 -38 28 3.54 52.89 145 
Left 
hippocampus 
-24 -30 -8 4.90 148.29 142 
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Figure 8: Activations in the three conditions vs. baseline in the insula lobe. The cross hairs were 
centred on MNI coordinates 34, -18, 10. 
3.2.2. Group Comparison ANOVA for conditions (Favourite vs. ToM vs. 
Control)  
A further comparison considered the groups’ neural response for each of the task 
conditions (Favourite vs ToM vs Control). Results showed that there were significant 
difference in BOLD activations between the three task conditions within the hippocampi, 
insulae and inferior parietal lobes. Table 7 shows the largest clusters within the brain that 
showed significant differences (see appendix XX for a full list of the areas where neural 
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Height threshold: F= 8.65, P=0.01 (uncorrected); extent threshold: k= 10 voxels. 
 
Figure 9: Activations when comparing the three conditions against each other, significant difference in 
BOLD responses was found in the inferior parietal lobe. The cross hairs are centred on MNI 
coordinates 40, -38, 32. 
3.2.3. ToM vs. Control condition. 
To investigate if the ToM condition elicited neural activations which were different 
from those produced in the control condition, these two conditions were contrasted against 
 MNI coordinates    
Area of 
activation 




-24 -30 -8 4.90 148.29 142 








-50 -38 38 3.54 29.54 145 
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each other, revealing areas of significant difference within left/right hippocampi, right 
superior temporal gyrus and some small clusters of activation in the insula (table 8).It appears 
that these differences were due to decreased ToM activations within these areas, whilst the 
control saw increased BOLD responses within these areas.  
 
Figure 10: Significantly different activations found in the left hippocampus when comparing the ToM 
condition versus the control condition. The cross hairs are centred on MNI coordinates -24, -30, -8. 
 3.2.4 Favourite Condition vs. ToM condition. 
Further analysis was considered to test if the neural areas activated during the ToM 
condition were significantly different from those activated during the favourite condition. 
Significant differences with an increase for the ToM condition relative to favourite condition 
were found in the inferior parietal cortex, insulae, amygdala and a small cluster of activation 
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Table 7:Larger clusters of brain activations during different contrasts.  
 MNI coordinates    Contrast(s) 










32 -30 -12 3.14 26.90 98 
 Superior 
Temporal Gyrus 
40 -34 14 2.98 22.58 43 
Favourite 
vs ToM 
Right Insula lobe 34 -18 10 4.21 90.07 288 
 Inferior Parietal 
lobe 
42 -36 30 4.12 80.27 290 
 Inferior Parietal 
lobe 
-50 -38 28 3.78 54.10 149 
 Amygdala -30 -10 0 3.39 35.15 105 
Height threshold: F=11.26; P=0.01(uncorrected); extent threshold: k=10 voxels. 
3.3.5 ANOVA on time regressors  
This study we also considered the effect of time over the three conditions. However, 
no large clusters of activations were observed.   
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Figure 11: Activation within the inferior parietal cortex when considering favourite condition versus the 
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4. Discussion 
 One of the crucial aims of this research was to ensure that the eye gaze task developed 
was compatible with an fMRI scanner sequence and that the participants’ responses were 
being made at the appropriate time to elicit neural activity. This study has clearly fulfilled this 
aim as the results show how there are neural activations for the tasks which are significantly 
different from those neural activations that are elicited during the baseline condition. These 
differences were found in the inferior parietal cortex, right insula lobe and the left 
hippocampus. As well as this the participants’ responses were assessed in terms of accuracy 
and error types. Essentially this means that this eye gaze preference task can be utilised in 
further research investigating the neural basis of ToM.  
One of the aspects which was analysed within this research was whether there was a 
significant difference between the mean accuracy score for the ToM condition compared to 
the control condition. After analysis results indicate that as predicted that there is no 
significant difference between these two mean accuracy scores. This is a logical finding as 
the participants within the study were all assessed and found to be typically healthy 
individuals. Therefore they all have the ability to infer which of the pictures the face likes 
best from the eye gaze cues as well as having no problems with detecting eye gaze direction. 
Hence it could be possible that direct and mutual gaze are a perquisite of our social 
interactions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Emery et al., 2000) as this task uses simple eye gaze 
cues to infer another’s mental state. So as suggested by Baron-Cohen et al (1997; Emery et 
al., 2000) eye gaze could be a crucial building block within our mentalising development. 
This section of the results replicates previous research using the eye gaze preference task 
such as Snowden et al., (2003; Shamay- Tsoory et al., 2007) as when considering the 
accuracy scores of their controls with their eye gaze preference task they found that ceiling 
effects were reached within the ToM conditions and their control conditions, hence no 
significant difference was found between their mean accuracy score for either condition, just 
as seen in this piece of research.  
 Although ceiling effects were noted within the results there were a couple of errors 
made, these occurred within the ToM condition i.e. when the individual had to judge which 
picture the face liked best from the faces’ eyes. Errors evidently occurred when the 
participant picked a picture that the face was not looking at as the one that the face liked best. 
Although only two of these errors were made they were made by different participants and at 
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different trials within the task. One error occurred at the beginning of the task condition 
whilst the other occurred straight after the first rest period. One hundred percent of the errors 
made within the fMRI study were classified as favourite errors as described in the Snowden 
et al. (2007). Meaning that the errors were occurring due to the participant simply saying 
which picture was their personal favourite. Snowden et al. (2007) describe the favourite error 
in terms of their FTD patients as a numerous amount of their errors tended to relate to their 
personal favourite picture. They reasoned that this was due to their inability to inhibit their 
favourite response or alternative that FTD patients live within their own egocentric world and 
so fail to recognise or attribute others mental states when they differ from their own 
(Snowden et al., 2003). Within this study although the participant is choosing their personal 
favourite picture when these favourite errors occur, it is most likely that the subject is 
adjusting to the new instructions required from the task. Evidence for this can be seen in 
when the errors occur within this condition, as one error occurred straightway whilst the other 
occurred after the first rest period, here the participants may have briefly forgot the new 
instructions for the task, therefore reverting back to the previous task condition of which 
picture they liked best.  
The errors within the fMRI study can all be classified as favourite errors but this was 
not the case for the pilot study, as the two errors within this study were unclassified. The two 
errors made during this experiment were made by the same individual and both occurred 
within the ToM condition. It is suggested that these errors could be related to the fact that the 
individual was choosing the most dominant picture. Dominance in this sense refers to the 
picture which stood out the most within the combination of pictures e.g. the picture that had 
the brightest colours.  
 As mentioned one of the main aims of the study was to pilot the eye gaze preference 
task within an fMRI study as this task was novel to that particular environment. However, a 
secondary aim of the study was to consider which brain areas were activated during this ToM 
task, these areas could then be considered as potential regions which are specific for our ToM 
skill. At the start of the study it was suggested that perhaps significant increases in neural 
activations for the ToM condition would be found within the mPFC/OFC (Baron-Cohen 
1999; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2003), TPJ (Saxe et al., 2003; 2005; 2008), 
Temporal Poles (Gallagher et al., 2003), STS/STG (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Gallagher et 
al., 2002) or the amygdala ( Brunet et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 2005) as these are all areas 
which have been noted by previous brain imaging studies as specific for our ToM abilities. 
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To investigate this within the present study we compared the neural responses elicited during 
the ToM condition task against BOLD response found in the control condition task. 
Significantly different neural responses were noted in the left/right hippocampi, right superior 
temporal gyrus and the insula. It appeared that these areas were where there was a decreased 
activation for the ToM condition when compared with the control condition. So although 
studies have speculated that the STG and Insula are involved in ToM processes (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1999; Brunet et al., 2000; Grezes et al., Mitchell et al., 2005) it appears within 
these studies they were more activated during the control condition. One of the reasons why 
the STG may have been more responsive during the control condition was that participant 
was making decisions purely based on eye gaze, no emotional judgment was required. The 
participant was being explicitly told to pick which picture the face was looking at, as previous 
research has suggested that the STG is involved in eye gaze detection (Brothers 1990; Itier & 
Batty, 2009).   
 As well as these areas there was a significant difference found in the left and right 
hippocampi when comparing these two task conditions, again this area has not been noted 
within any of the brain imaging literature reviewed within the introduction. The hippocampus 
is often linked with our memory function (Squire, Ojemann, Miezin, Peterson, Videen and 
Racichle, 1992) like the other two neural areas it was noted that the difference was due to 
increased activations for control condition. It is unsure why the hippocampi would have been 
differently activated in these two tasks. Perhaps it is due to the fact that the control condition 
was the last condition to be presented to the subjects therefore they could have been 
remembering certain associations made within the first two conditions with the pictures e.g. 
perhaps the pictures were triggering their personal memories from which one was their 
favourite picture.   
Unfortunately it seems that the study failed to note any specific increases in neural 
activations for the ToM condition when comparing it against the control condition.   
However, the study also compared the BOLD responses from the ToM condition 
against the BOLD responses from the favourite condition to investigate if there were any 
areas which responded differently to these two conditions. Results found that there were 
significantly different BOLD activations within the inferior parietal cortex, insula, amygdala 
and left STG when comparing these two conditions. It appeared that the ToM condition when 
compared to the favourite condition was eliciting increased neural responses within these 
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specified areas. All of these areas have been noted in previous brain imaging research as 
responding when tasks assess our ToM ability (Fletcher et al., 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999; Mitchell et al., 2005; Saxe et al., 2003; Grezes et al., 2004).  
The amygdala is often associated with the ability to detect emotions (Brothers, 1990; 
Morris et al., 1996) therefore perhaps the ToM condition increased activations within this 
area were due to the fact that face was expressing a happy emotion and they were recognising 
this. It is not surprising that decreased activations were found within this region for the 
control condition as in this condition no face was displayed and therefore no emotion had to 
be recognised. The inferior parietal cortex has been linked with theory of mind research as 
there are several studies which have found activations within this area specific for ToM 
(Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2002; Kobayashi et al., 2007). Therefore perhaps this 
area is an important region of  ToM process, as within the current research when compared to 
the favourite condition higher BOLD responses were found in this region. The inferior 
parietal cortex is one of the sites known to contain mirror neurones (Gallase & Goldman, 
1998), these neurones are theorised to be behind one of the suggested strategies of how we 
conduct our mentalsing skill. This strategy is known as the simulation theory of mentalising 
and involves the idea that these neurones help us to infer others’ mental states by comparing 
their mental states with our own (Gallase et al., 2004). Therefore perhaps this is why this 
regions was activated within the ToM condition as these neurones were implementing the 
simulation strategy. Finally the STG as noted earlier is associated with the detection of eye 
gaze therefore it seems appropriate this area is more activated in the ToM condition than the 
control, as the control condition requires no detection of eye gaze direction as no faces or 
eyes are involved within the stimuli.  
Although different neural responses have been noted within the study for the different 
tasks none are the areas which are thought to be central to our ToM capabilities as stipulated 
by other brain imaging studies. The differences in neural responses found within this study 
and others could have been related to the fact that this task was designed to rely less on 
language and executive functioning therefore this could have lead to different neural 
responses to process ToM. One has to remember that this task is novel to an imaging 
environment therefore it is difficult to say which brain regions should or should not have 
been activated.  
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4.1. Limitations within the study 
A potential weakness of the study as there is within any brain imaging study is that 
the fMRI relies on the assumption that different areas are related to qualitatively differences 
in psychological processes (Overwalle, 2009). But this assumption is not necessarily true 
(Henson, 2006; Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004). As brain regions are constructed of 
thousands of neurones, each of these neurones could have distinct functions which 
unfortunately cannot be teased apart with the current technique (Overwalle, 2009). As well as 
this one can never be 100% sure that the individual within the scanner is indeed concentrating 
solely on the task as they may be considering other factors e.g. something that happened 
earlier within that day.  
Another obvious limitation within the current research is that there were only 5 
participants scanned for the fMRI study, this is too few people to exclusively conclude from 
the results which brain areas are activated for this theory of mind eye gaze preference task.  
As perhaps with more controls there would have been different results, in the sense that more 
areas may have been significantly activated and perhaps these areas would have been areas in 
which the ToM condition had a significant increased neural response. Therefore it is 
suggested that further research considers administering this to more control participants to 
remove any doubt over results collected by this study due to lack of participant numbers.  
The fact that the task used within this study is novel to an fMRI environment in itself 
causes limitations, as the results cannot be adequately compared to previous brain imaging 
research as no other brain imaging studies have utilised this particular task. Therefore brain 
activations elicited from a simple eye gaze preference task are being compared to neural 
responses from complex story tasks, although both assessing our mentalising ability, the story 
task shall have interference from brain regions which are recruited for other processes e.g. 
our language understanding.  
The task itself may be a limitation when considering which brain regions are activated 
during ToM. As its sensitivity has been questioned previously by Shamay-Tsoory et al 
(2007), as ceiling effects were found in accuracy scores for this study as were they found 
within the present research. Perhaps the fact that the task is a first order ToM task means that 
the neural regions required to process it are the more peripheral brain regions found within 
the ToM literature.  
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 4.3 Future Research/Directions 
Firstly an extension of this study should be commenced as this research only scanned 
five control subjects, perhaps with a larger control population one would be able to say with 
more confidence which areas are said to be activated in the this ToM eye gaze preference 
task. Therefore suggesting which areas are involved in our ToM aptitude.  
Future research should perhaps consider using this eye gaze preference task within a 
clinical population in combination with brain imaging techniques. As Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2007 have already shown how this task is sensitive enough to show problems within 
schizophrenia patients and Snowden et al., 2003 have proven that FTD patients have 
significant problems with this task. It therefore would be interesting to note how they perform 
these tasks within a scanning environment. Girardi et al., 2010 have also monopolised this 
task within their MND study to highlight how variants of MND patients not only have non-
social cognitive impairments but can also have emotional and social cognition deficits. Using 
the ToM eye gaze preference task within a brain imaging context to consider different clinical 
populations may help to highlight where the specific brain abnormalities occur within these 
clinical populations.  In turn this could lead to help with future diagnosis and treatment plans.  
The present study did consider the possibility that different brain regions are perhaps 
activated during our own favourite choose as compared to those activated when inferring 
others’ favourite chooses. However, this paper did not consider comparing the eye gaze 
preference task to other ToM tasks. As this is an exploratory study to consider if this task 
could adequately work within the confounds of an fMRI perhaps future research could 
consider if the neural activations elicited during this task are significantly different from brain 
regions excited within other ToM tasks.  
The task within this current experiment was considered to be a first-order ToM task, 
perhaps future research could expand this task to include second-order conditions. This may 
also counteract any problems which could have been due to the first-order task not being 
sensitive enough. A variety of eye gaze tasks could be constructed to assess the idea of 
cognitive and affective ToM abilities within a imaging paradigm, perhaps these could be 
adapted from thus seen in Shamay-Tsoory et al.,(2007) study. These paradigms could then 
lend evidence to the idea that ToM should be defined as two separate components.  
If possible future research should not only note the responses and errors made by the 
individual within this task but consider their reaction times for their responses within the 
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conditions as this as be noted to be a more sensitive method in the detection of differences 
between ToM and control conditions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). 
Perhaps with future studies the face could be developed into a more human like face 
in an attempt to make the task more ecologically valid.  
4.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion it appears that this particular ‘Theory of mind’ eye gaze preference task 
can indeed be used within a scanner environment. Therefore this task can be utilised in future 
research studies which wish to consider which areas of the brain are correlated with our ToM 
processes, whilst at the same time minimise the executive functions which are required to 
complete the task. However, unlike previous studies which have often referred to the 
importance of the mPFC /OFC and the TPJ (Gallagher et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 
Saxe et al., 2003; Gallagher et al., 2003) within our mentalising ability, this study was unable 
to implicate any areas which showed specific increases in neural activity for the ToM 
condition when compared to the control condition. Nevertheless it did pinpoint some areas 
that were activated differently when making decisions concerning our own favourite choices 
and inferring others’ favourite choices. As mentioned already the study could have failed to 
replicate previous ToM studies in finding specific activations within the PFC and or in the 
TPJ for various reasons, one of these major limitations could have been caused by the lack of 
participant numbers. Therefore immediate studies should seek to assess this ToM assessment 
tool on more control subjects to counteract any of the limitations caused by lack of subjects 
After which future research should seek to implement this assessment tool into clinical 
populations and possibly expand the task to include accepts of second-order ToM skills and 
cognitive and or  affective ToM abilities.  Although ultimately the main aim of this study was 
fulfilled as it adequately piloted the eye gaze preference task within the novel surroundings of 
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SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES 
The University of Edinburgh 




Telephone 0131 650 3440 
Direct Line to Dr Abrahams: 0131 650 3339 
Email: Psychology@ed.ac.uk 
Email Dr Abrahams: s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk 
 
VOLUNTEER INFORMATION SHEET 
Study title: “Neural Basis of Theory of Mind.’ 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is vital that you 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to 
read the following information and ensure that you understand all aspects involved, you can 
discuss this with other if you so wish. Ask if there is information that seems unclear or if you 
would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you want to take part. 
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What is the purpose of the study? 
Some neurological conditions can result in changes in emotions and behaviour. There are 
various methods which have been used to investigate these changes in emotions and 
behaviour, using one such method we are hoping to underpin the reason behind these changes 
in behaviour and emotion.   
Why I have been chosen? 
We will be seeing a total 8 control participants. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely your decision whether or not you take part in the above experiment. If you do 
decide to take part you shall be asked to keep this consent form and asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study you will be asked several background questions. 
All volunteers will be asked to perform a number of tasks, these tasks are straight forward 
and simple. They involve viewing objects on a laptop screen and being asked to choose an 
object according to the instructions you are given. The tasks will require you to answer 
verbally aloud and your answers will be recorded by the experimenter. The task will require 
around 30 minutes of your time and you will be reimbursed for our time with £6.00. 
What do I have to do? 
You do not have to take any medication or undergo any invasive procedure whatsoever. 
During the your session with the experimenter you will be given instructions for each of the 
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What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
If you feel distressed at any time during the process, it is important that you let the 
experimenter know straight away. If you feel distressed after the experiment, please contact 
Dr. Sharon Abrahams 0131 650 3339. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There will be no direct benefit to you by taking part, and your individual results will not be 
revealed to you. However, it is hoped that the research will improve the understanding of the 
changes in emotions and behaviour that individuals with different disorders experience and 
may influence care practices in the future.  
What if something goes wrong? 
Whilst we do not anticipate any adverse effects from taking part in the study, if you are 
harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements. If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds 
for legal action but you have to pay for it. Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have 
any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be 
available to you.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
 All the information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. Any information 
about you will have your name and corresponding information removed so that you cannot be 
recognised from it.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be involved in a MSc research project. 
Who is organising the research?  
The study is being organised an MSc student, Nicola Elder who is currently attending 
Edinburgh University and Dr. Sharon Abrahams from the University of Edinburgh and 
Lothian Clinical Neuropsychology Unit at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by ethics committee in the NHS and the Psychology 
department of Edinburgh University. 
Contact for further information 
If you wish to ask anything further, please contact Dr. Sharon Abrahams via the address 
below: 
Department of Psychology, PPLS 
7 George Square 
Edinburgh, 
EH8 9JZ. 
OR via the following telephone numbers or email addresses: 
Dr. Abrahams on 0131 650 3339 (s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk) 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. You will be given a copy to keep. If you have 
understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please complete the consent sheet 
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CONSENT FORM- Confidential 
 
Title of project: Neural Basis of Theory of Mind  
Name of Researcher: Nicola Elder        Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information  
sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity 
 to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and  
that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving  
any reason, without my medical care or legal rights  
being affected. 
3. I understand that my voice will be audio taped  
for the purpose of the study. 
4. I agree to take part in this above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person taking consent  Date   Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
Researcher     Date   Signature 
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Appendix 2: Favourite Recording Sheet 
 
Recording sheet for Favourite task 
Name: 
Date of Birth: 
Contact no.: 
Participants answers circled.  




Corn Beetroots Cabbage Asparagus 
Cucumber Potato Celery Spinach 
Broccoli Scallions Tomato Carrots 
Vegetables  
Pepper Turnip Cauliflower Onion 
Dishwasher Computer Microwave Sofa 
Kettle Stairs Lamp Cooker 








Bath T.V.  Wardrobe Bed 
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Donald Homar Micky Simba 
Daffy Shrek Winnie Pluto 
Snow White Minnie Bugs Peterpan 
Bart Tigger Little Mermaid Fred Flintstone 
Cartoons 
Bambi Tinkerbelle Donkey Nemo 
Blueberry Cherries Kiwi Lime 
Apple Avocado Banana Grapes 
Prunes Mango Peach Raspberries 
Strawberry Orange Lemon Pear 
Fruits 
Pineapple Plum Melon Cranberries 
Butterfly Goat Penguin Tiger 
Dog Horse Whale Lion 
Chicken Goldfish Pig Rabbit 
Ape Frog Parrot Sheep 
Animals 
Cat Elephant Mouse Shark 





Kettle Stairs Toilet 
Table T.V.  Bookcase Bath 
Dishwasher Armchair Chair Computer 
Household 
Items 
Sink Wardrobe Bed Microwave 
Fruits Avocado Kiwi Raspberries Plum 
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Banana Blueberry Melon Orange 
Pear Apple Mango Lime 
Peach Strawberry Prunes Grapes 
Cranberries Lemon Pineapple Cherries 
Cat Penguin Rabbit Sheep 
Elephant Goat Horse Mouse 
Whale Parrot Butterfly Lion 
Shark Tiger Chicken Dog 
Animals 
Frog Ape Goldfish Pig 
Corn Celery Cabbage Cauliflower 
Lettuce Cucumber Tomato Scallions 
Carrots Turnip Potato Onion 
Butternut 
Squash 
Parsnip Broccoli Spinach 
Vegetables 
Beetroot Asparagus Peas Pepper 
Micky Mouse Bambi Peterpan Minnie 
Daffy Donald Snow White Shrek 
Homar Tigger Fred Flintstone Winnie 
Nemo Pluto Bugs Donkey 
Cartoons 
Little Mermaid Tinkerbell Simba Bart 
Duck Owl Hedgehog Cow Practice 
Snake Bee Seal Crab 
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Monkey Starfish Wolf Camels 
Zebra Giraffe Squirrel Donkey 




Practice Duck Owl Hedgehog Cow 
 Snake Bee Seal Crab 
 Monkey Starfish Wolf Camels 
 Zebra Giraffe Squirrel Donkey 
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Appendix 3: Theory of Mind Recording Sheet. 
 
75 
3013747  Neural Basis 
 
76 
3013747  Neural Basis 
Appendix 4: Control Condition Recording Sheet. 
 
Recording sheet for ‘Looking at’ (Control) task 
Name: 
Date of Birth: 
Contact no.: 
Participants answers circled.  
Category Upper Left Upper right Bottom Left Bottom Right 
Butterfly Goat Penguin Tiger 
Chicken Goldfish Pig Rabbit 
Dog Horse Whale Lion 
Ape Frog Parrot Sheep 
Animals  
 
Cat Elephant Mouse Shark 




Corn Beetroots Cabbage Asparagus 
Cucumber Potato Celery Spinach 
Vegetables  
Broccoli Scallions Tomato Carrots 
Household Kettle Stairs Lamp Cooker 
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Dishwasher Computer Microwave Sofa 





Bookcase Table Washing 
Machine 
Armchair 
Peach Strawberry Prunes Grapes 
Pear Apple Mango Lime 
Avocado Kiwi Raspberries Plum 
Cranberries Lemon Pineapple Cherries 
Fruits 
Banana Blueberry Melon Orange 
Nemo Pluto Bugs Donkey 
Homar Tigger Fred 
Flintstone 
Winnie 
Daffy Donald Snow White Shrek 
Micky Mouse Bambi Peterpan Minnie 
Cartoons 
Little Mermaid Tinkerbelle Simba Bart 
Beetroot Asparagus Peas Pepper 
Corn Celery Cabbage Cauliflower 
Butternut 
Squash 
Parsnip Broccoli Spinach 
Lettuce Cucumber Tomato Scallions 
Vegetables 
Carrots Turnip Potato Onion 
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Cat Penguin Rabbit Sheep 
Elephant Goat Horse Mouse 
Whale Parrot Butterfly Lion 
Shark Tiger Chicken Dog 
Animals 
Frog Ape Goldfish Pig 
Cooker Lamp Washing 
Machine 
Sofa 
Table T.V.  Bookcase Bath 
Sink Wardrobe Bed Microwave 





Kettle Stairs Toilet 
Bart Tigger Little 
Mermaid 
Fred Flintstone 
Snow White Minnie Bugs Peterpan 
Daffy Shrek Winnie Pluto 
Donald Homar Micky Simba 
Cartoons 
Bambi Tinkerbelle Donkey Nemo 
Blueberry Cherries Kiwi Lime 
Apple Avocado Banana Grapes 
Pineapple Plum Melon Cranberries 
Strawberry Orange Lemon Pear 
Fruits 
Prunes Mango Peach Raspberries 
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Appendix 5: Pictures Sourced for Stimuli. 
Practice Trials Pictures: 
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Vegetable Pictures:  
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Household Pictures: 
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Cartoon Pictures: 
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Fruit Pictures: 
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You are going to see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to name each of the pictures 
and choose which one is your favourite. 
Please name the objects on the screen first before saying your favourite. 
Press SPACE BAR to continue. 
Slide 2 
You may see some pictures more than once but this is not a memory test. 
Please name the pictures and then choose your favourite one from the four presented in front 
of you. 
Press SPACE BAR to continue. 
Also changed the sentence at the top of the screen to read : Which picture is your favourite? – 
as discussed yesterday. 
Last slide 
The end. 
Practice – off line. 
Slide 1 
Welcome. 
 Below is a face that you will see in the middle of the screen throughout this task. 
(yellow face) 
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Slide 2 
You are going to see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
In the centre of the screen there will be a face. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
Slide 3 
Please wait until the face turns GREEN before saying the name of the picture that the face 
LIKES BEST.  
Only say the name of the picture when the face turns GREEN! 
(green face) 
Slide 4 
Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face LIKE BEST! 
 A cross will be flashed in the centre of the screen in between each presentation.  
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
Slide 5 
Please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 









 Below is a face that you will see in the middle of the screen throughout this task. 
(yellow face). 
Slide 2 
You are going to see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
In the centre of the screen there will be a face. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
Slide 3 
When the face is yellow you will hear the noise of the scanner. But when the face turns 
GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST.   
Only say the name of the picture when the face turns GREEN! 
(green face) 
Slide 4 
Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face LIKES BEST! 
 A cross will be flashed in the centre of the screen in between each presentation.  
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
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Slide 5 
Please remain as still as possible throughout the task. 
Please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
Like Best- off line. 
Slide 1 
Welcome 
The instructions are the same as in the practice task. 
You will see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
 A face will be in the  middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
As before please wait until the face turns GREEN before saying the name of the picture that 
the face LIKES BEST. 
Slide 2 
Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face LIKE BEST! 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
Sentence at the top: Which picture does the face like best? 
Like best- scanner. 
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Slide 1 
Welcome 
The instructions are the same as in the practice task. 
You will see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
 A face will be in the middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
Slide 2 
As before you will hear the noise of the scanner when the face is yellow. But when the face 
turns GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST.  
Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face LIKES BEST! 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
Slide 3 
Please remain as still as possible throughout the task. 
Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
End slide 
Please remain still and silent. 
The next part of the task shall commence shortly. 
Looking at.- offline. 
Slide 1 
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Welcome 
As before one you will see four pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
A face will be in the  middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face is 
LOOKING AT? 
Slide 2 
As before please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying the name of the picture 
that the face is LOOKING AT!  
Only say the name of the picture when the face turns GREEN! 
 Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face is LOOKING AT! 
As before you will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it 
quickly. 
Slide 3 
A cross will be flashed in the centre of the screen in between each presentation.  
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
Please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
Looking at- scanner. 
Slide 1 
Welcome 
As before one you will see four pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
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A face will be in the  middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face is 
LOOKING AT? 
Slide 2 
As before you will hear the noise of the scanner when the face is yellow. But when the face 
turns GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture the face 
is LOOKING AT. 
Only say the name of the picture when the face turns GREEN! 
 Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face is LOOKING AT! 
Slide 3 
As before you will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it 
quickly. 
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
Please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
End Slide 
This is the end of the task. 
Please remain still and silent until instructed to move. 
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Appendix 7: Information Sheet and Consent form for fMRI study. 
Psychology 
SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES 
The University of Edinburgh 




Telephone 0131 650 3440 
Direct Line to Dr Abrahams: 0131 650 3339 
Email: Psychology@ed.ac.uk 
Email Dr Abrahams: s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk 
 
VOLUNTEER INFORMATION SHEET 
Study title: “Neural Basis of Theory of Mind”: An fMRI study 
Thank- you for the interest in this work. 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is vital that you 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to 
read the following information and ensure that you understand all aspects involved, you can 
discuss this with other if you so wish. Ask if there is information that seems unclear or if you 
would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you want to take part. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Some neurological conditions can result in changes in emotions and behaviour, it is still 
unclear what regions of the brain are associated with these changes. To understand these 
changes important to gather information off healthy individuals, in particular considering the 
reason behind these changes and the brain regions associated with these changes. Hence in 
this study fMRI will be used to collect images of the brain whilst you conduct tasks. These 
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tasks represent the reason why emotion and social changes in patients may occur, and so 
hopefully will highlight the regions of the brain which are involved in this process. The tasks 
are simple, as you will be asked to view a series of objects from which you will have to 
choose one according to instructions given at beginning. 
Why I have been chosen? 
We will be seeing a between 10-16 control participants. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely your decision whether or not you take part in the above experiment. If you do 
decide to take part you shall be asked to keep this consent form and asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part in the study you will be asked several background questions. 
You will asked to attend an appointment at the University of Edinburgh Imaging Research 
Centre, Department of Clinical Neurosciences at Western General Hospital to undergo a 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) brain scan. The scan will last approximately 
45 minutes and provides us with pictures of your brain. You will not be required to visit your 
GP. During the scan you will be perform a task.  
You will be asked to lie on the scanner bed for around 45 minutes. While you are in the 
scanner, a series of pictures of our brain will be taken whilst conducting tasks. The tasks are 
very simple eye gaze tasks and you shall verbally indicate your answer when in instructed to 
by the screen. You will reimbursed for our time with £20.00 
Whilst in the scan your responses will be recorded but these responses will be confidential.  
What do I have to do?  
You do not have to take any medication or undergo any invasive procedure whatsoever. 
During your scanning session, you will simply need to lie as still in the scanner whilst 
completing a couple of tasks, during which time the scanner will be acquiring pictures. The 
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scanner itself makes a loud clicking noise while it operates. For your comfort, you will be 
provided with ear plugs or headphones. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
MRI uses a combination of powerful magnets and radio waves to create very high quality 
images of your brain. We do not anticipate any health risks from taking part in this study. 
MRI does not use X-rays, and no drugs or injections will be involved. It you agree to join the 
study, we will check that it is perfectly safe for you to be scanned. A long as people with any 
magnetic metal implants are excluded from the study (such as heart pacemarkers or metal 
clips in the brain), there are no known risks. In addition, there are no after effects of the scan. 
This research is designed to improve knowledge of how the brain works, and are not for 
diagnostic or clinical purposes. However, a consultant radiologist will examine these scans 
and a report will be sent either to you GP or the Principle Investigator of the study. You may 
therefore need to give your GP’s name and address to the person who has recruited you into 
the study. 
You should be aware that there is a small possibility (about 3%) of a significant abnormality 
being detected in your scan, which may need to be acted upon, or GP told about, in case of 
any future illness. The study investigator or research centre Radiologist will be happy to 
discuss this further with you if you so wish. 
If you feel distressed at any time during the process, it is important that you let the 
experimenter know straight away. If you feel distressed after the experiment, please contact 
Dr. Sharon Abrahams 0131 650 3339. 
Pregnancy 
Because MRI uses radiofrequencies and magnetic fields, pregnant women are not routinely 
scanned for research purposes. Pregnant women must not therefore take part in this study; 
neither should women who plan to become pregnant during the study. Any women who finds 
that she has become pregnant before taking part in the study should immediately tell her 
research doctor. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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There will be no direct benefit to you by taking part, and your individual results will not be 
revealed to you. However, it is hoped that the research will improve the understanding of the 
changes in emotions and behaviour that individuals with different disorders experience and 
may influence care practices in the future.  
What if something goes wrong? 
Whilst we do not anticipate any adverse effects from taking part in the study, if you are 
harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements. If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds 
for legal action but you have to pay for it. Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have 
any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be 
available to you.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
 All the information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. Any information 
about you will have your name and corresponding information removed so that you cannot be 
recognised from it.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be involved in a MSc research project. 
Who is organising the research? 
The study is being organised an MSc student, Nicola Elder who is currently attending 
Edinburgh University and Dr. Sharon Abrahams from the University of Edinburgh and 
Lothian Clinical Neuropsychology Unit at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by ethics committee in the NHS and the Psychology 
department of Edinburgh University. 
Contact for further information 
If you wish to ask anything further, please contact Dr. Sharon Abrahams via the address 
below: 
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Department of Psychology, PPLS 
7 George Square 
Edinburgh, 
EH8 9JZ. 
OR via the following telephone numbers or email addresses: 
Dr. Abrahams on 0131 650 3339 (s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk) 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. You will be given a copy to keep. If you have 
understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please complete the consent sheet 
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CONSENT FORM- Confidential 
 
Title of project: Neural Basis of Theory of Mind: An fMRI study 
Name of Researcher: Nicola Elder        Please initial box 
 
5. I confirm that I have read and understand the information  
sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity 
 to ask questions. 
6. I understand that my participation is voluntary and  
that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving  
any reason, without my medical care or legal rights  
being affected. 
7. I understand that my voice will be audio taped  
for the purpose of the study. 
8. I agree to take part in this above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
Name of Person taking consent  Date   Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
Researcher     Date   Signature 
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Appendix 9: Instructions for the three conditions within FMRI study. 
Favourite Task Condition- top sentence: Which picture is your favourite? 
Slide1 
Welcome! 
You are going to see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture  is your 
favourite. 
There will be a circle in the middle of screen.  
Slide 2 
When the circle is YELLOW you will hear the noise of the scanner. But when the circle turns 
GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture is your 
favourite.  
Only say one name, and only speak when the face turns GREEN and the scanner is silent! 
You may see some pictures more than once but this is not a memory test. 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
Slide 3 
A cross will be flashed in the centre of the screen in between each presentation. 
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
Please remain still as possible throughout the task. 
Please remain silent at all other times in the task. 
End slide 
This is the end of this part of the task. 
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Please remain still and silent as the next task shall begin shortly. 
Like Best Condition: Top sentence: Which picture does the face like best? 
Slide 1 
In the next scans a face will appear in the centre of the screen. 
(Below this sentence the yellow face with eyes facing straight forward should show.) 
Slide 2 
As before you will see some pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
 A face will be in the  middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
Slide 3 
When the face is YELLOW you will hear the noise of the scanner. But when the face turns 
GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture the face 
LIKES BEST. 
Only say one name, and only speak when the face turns GREEN and the scanner is silent! 
(Below this the green face with eyes looking straight forward should show.) 
Slide 4 
A cross will be flashed in the centre of the screen in between the presentation. 
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for next presentation. 
You will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it quickly. 
Slide 5 
Please remain as still as possible throughout the task. 
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Remain silent at all other times in the task. 
Please wait until the face had turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
End slide 
Please remain still and silent. 
The next part of the task shall commence shortly. 
Looking at condition: top sentence: Which picture is the face looking at? 
Slide 1 
Welcome 
As before one you will see four pictures,  
one in each corner of the screen. 
A face will be in the  middle of the screen. 
At the top of the screen a sentence will appear, it will ask you to say which picture the face is 
LOOKING AT? 
Slide 2 
As before you will hear the noise of the scanner when the face is yellow. But when the face 
turns GREEN the scanner will be silent and at this time you should say which picture the face 
is LOOKING AT. 
Only say the name of the picture when the face turns GREEN! 
 Please only say the name of one picture, the picture that the face is LOOKING AT! 
Slide 3 
As before you will only have a short period of time to make your decision so please make it 
quickly. 
When you see a red circle please rest and wait for the next presentation. 
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Please wait until the face has turned GREEN before saying your answer. 
Please try to respond as quickly as possible once the face has turned GREEN. 
End slide 
This is the end of the task. 
Please remain still and silent until instructed to move. 
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